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Abstract
In a weighted majority voting game, the weights of the players are determined based on some
socio-economic parameter. A number of measures have been proposed to measure the voting powers
of the different players. A basic question in this area is to what extent does the variation in the voting
powers reflect the variation in the weights? The voting powers depend on the winning threshold.
So, a second question is what is the appropriate value of the winning threshold? In this work, we
propose two simple ideas to address these and related questions in a quantifiable manner. The first
idea is to use Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between the weight vector and the power profile to
measure the similarity between weight and power. The second idea is to use standard inequality
measures to quantify the inequality in the weight vector as well as in the power profile. These two
ideas answer the first question. Both the weight-power similarity and inequality scores of voting
power profiles depend on the value of the winning threshold. For situations of practical interest, it
turns out that it is possible to choose a value of the winning threshold which maximises the similarity
score and the also minimises the difference in the inequality scores of the weight vector and the power
profile. This provides an answer to the second question. Using the above formalisation, we are able
to quantitatively argue that it is sufficient to consider only the vector of swings for the players as
the power measure. We apply our methodology to the voting games arising in the decision making
processes of the International Monetory Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). In the case of
IMF, we provide quantitative evidence that the actual winning threshold that is currently used is
sub-optimal and instead propose a winning threshold which has a firm analytical backing. On the
other hand, in the case of EU, we provide quantitative evidence that the presently used threshold is
very close to the optimal.
1 Introduction
Voting is arguably the most important aspect of decision making in a democratic set up. A committee
settles an issue by accepting or rejecting some resolution related to the issue. While unanimity or
consensus is desirable, this may not always be possible due to the conflicting interests of the different
committee members. In such a situation, a voting procedure among the members is used to either
accept or reject a resolution. A resolution is accepted or passed, if a certain number of persons vote in
its favour, else it fails and is rejected.
In its basic form, each committee member has a single vote. Many scenarios of practical interest,
on the other hand, assign weights to the committee members. These weights need not be the same for
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all the members. In the context of weighted voting, a resolution is accepted, if the sum total of the
weights of the members who vote in its favour cross a previously decided upon threshold. A common
example of weighted voting is a company boardroom, where the members have weights in proportion
to the shares that they hold in the company. Important examples of weighted voting in the context of
public policy are the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Voting procedures have been formally studied in the game theory literatue under the name of voting
games. Due to its real life importance, weighted majority voting games have received a lot of attention.
In the literature on voting games, the members are called players. One of the basic questions is how
much influence does a player have in determining the outcome of a voting procedure? In other words,
what is the power of a player in a voting game? In quantitative terms, it is desirable to measure the
power of a player in a voting game by assigning a non-negative real number to the player. A power
measure assigns such a number to each player in the game. This leads to the basic question of what
constitutes a good measure of power of a player in a voting game. The literature contains a number of
power measures. Each one of these measures aim to capture certain aspects of the informal notion of
power in a voting game. We refer to (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) for a comprehensive discussion to
voting games and the various power measures. An introduction to the area can be found in (Chakravarty
et al., 2015).
Consider the setting of weighted majority voting games. For any such game, the players are assigned
weights based on socio-economic parameters. As a result, there is a variation in the weights of the
players. Further, given any power measure, we obtain a variation in the powers of the different players.
It is well known that the variation in the voting powers does not necessarily reflect the variation in the
weights. In this context, the following three questions can be formulated.
1. To what extent does the variation in the voting powers reflect the variation in the weights?
2. Is the inequality present in the weights preserved in the voting powers?
3. How does the value of the winning threshold (i.e., the threshold which is required to be crossed
for a motion to be passed) affect the above two questions?
This work addresses the above questions. The questions posed are not merely theoretical. Similar
questions have been posed in (Leech, 2002b) in the context of measurement of voting power in IMF.
For example, the following text fragments appear in (Leech, 2002b).
“... weighted voting raises the important question of whether the resulting inequality
of power over actual decisions is precisely what was intended for the relationship between
power and contribution.”
“How does the voting power of individual countries compare with their nominal votes? To
what extent is the degree of inequality in the distribution of votes reflected in the distribution
of voting power?”
“Different types of decisions use different decision rules, some requiring a special super-
majority. What effect do different decision rules have on the distribution of power and also
on the power of the voting body itself to act?”
The work (Leech, 2002b) makes a qualitative analysis of the above issues. Our work allows a quantitative
analysis of these issues. In more details, our work makes the following contributions.
Measurement of similarity between weights and voting powers. We propose the use of Pear-
son’s correlation coefficient as a measure of similarity between the weight vector of the players and the
vector of voting powers of the players.
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Measurement of inequality in weights and voting powers. There is a large literature on the
measurement of inequality in a vector of values obtained from measurement of various social parameters.
A survey on measurement of inequality appears in (Cowell, 2016). The variation of the values in such
a vector is captured by an inequality index. A number of inequality indices have been proposed in the
literature. We propose the use of such inequality indices to measure the inequality in the weights and
also in the voting powers. This allows the comparison of the inequality present in the weights to that
present in the voting powers.
Winning threshold as a controllable parameter. Our formalisations of both the similarity be-
tween the weights and the voting powers as well as the measurement of inequality in the voting powers
have the winning threshold as a parameter. By varying this parameter, both the weight-power similarity
and the voting power inequality can be controlled. So, given a vector of weights, the winning threshold
can be set to a certain value to maximise the weight-power similarity or, to minimise the difference
between the inequality in the weights and the inequality in the voting powers.
In this context, we would like to discuss the broader issue of designing games to achieve certain
desirable power profiles. This is often called the inverse problem for voting games. Usually the goal is
to determine a set of weights which result in the target powers. For example, in the context of the IMF
voting game, an iterative algorithm to determine weights has been proposed in (Leech, 2002b). There
is one major drawback of this approach. As mentioned earlier, in a weighted majority voting game, the
weights often represent a socio-economic parameter. When the weights are artificially obtained (say,
using an iterative algorithm), their interpretation in the socio-economic context is lost. It then becomes
hard to provide a natural justification of the weights.
Our approach of having the winning threshold as a controllable parameter provides an alternative
method of designing games. For the complete specification of a game, both the weights and the winning
threshold need to be specified. In our approach, the weights do not change and hence they retain
their original interpretation arising from the background socio-economic application. We only suggest
tuning the winning threshold so that the resulting power profile is “imbued” with the intuitive natural
justification of the weights. Games designed using such an approach can be much better explained to
the general public than games where the weights are artificially obtained.
Detailed study. We consider seven different voting power measures and two different inequality
indices. We show that the scaling invariance property of an inequality measure as well as that of
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient divides the voting power measures into three groups. The non-
normalised Banzhaf measure, the normalised Banzhaf index and the two Coleman measures fall into
one group; the public good measure and public good index defined by Holler fall into a second group
and the Deegan-Packel measure is in the third group. We show that any two power measures in the
same group have the same behaviour with respect to both the similarity index and the inequality index.
This brings down the complexity of the analysis.
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature on the comparative suitabilities of the Banzhaf
and the Coleman indices (Banzhaf, 1965; Brink and Laan, 1998; Coleman, 1971; Dubey and Shapley,
1979; Laruelle and Valenciano, 2001; Lehrer, 1998; Laruelle and Valenciano, 2011; Barua et al., 2009).
This discussion has both been qualitative and also formal in the sense of axiomatically deriving the
indices (Brink and Laan, 1998; Lehrer, 1998). Our work provides a new perspective to this discussion.
The stand-alone values of the powers of the players as measured by any power measure are perhaps not
of much interest by themselves. It is only in a relative sense that they acquire relevance. There are two
ways to consider this relative sense, in comparison to the weights and in comparison among themselves.
We propose to quantify the relative notion in comparison to the weights by the correlation between the
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weight vector and the power profile and to quantify the relative values of the powers among themselves
by an appropriate inequality score. Under both of these quantifications, we prove that the Banzhaf
and the Coleman power measures turn out to be the same. Based on this result, we put forward the
suggestion that there is perhaps no essential difference between these power measures. It is sufficient to
consider only the swings for the different players as was originally proposed by Banzhaf (and sometimes
called the raw Banzhaf measure). While this may sound a bit radical, our analysis based on correlation
and inequality does not leave scope for any other consideration. It is of course possible that there
is some other quantifiable way of distinguishing between the relative spreads of the Banzhaf and the
Coleman measures. This can be a possible future research question.
The literature contains a number of voting power measures which have been proposed as fundamen-
tally different from the swing based Banzhaf measure. Intuitive arguments have been forwarded as to
why these measures are appropriate for certain applications. In our opinion, a basic requirement for
any power measure is to reflect the “content” of weights. In addition to the Banzhaf measure, we have
also considered the Holler measures and the Deegan-Packel measure. Our simulation experiments as
well as computations with real-life data shows that the “content” of the weights is best captured by the
Banzhaf measure and neither the Holler measure nor the Deegan-Packel measure are good indicators of
this “content”. Based on this evidence, we put forward the suggestion that it is sufficient to consider
the swings as the only measure of power in voting games.
Applications. IMF decision making procedures have been modelled as voting games (Leech, 2002b).
Decision making in the EU has also been discussed in the context of voting games (Leech, 2002a).
The notions of similarity between the variations in the weights and the voting powers as well as the
relation between the inequality in the weights and that in the voting powers have been informally dis-
cussed. Our proposals for measuring weight-power similarity and the voting power inequality formalises
this intuition. We compute the various measures for the IMF game and (a simplified version of) the
EU voting game and suggest that the winning threshold can be used as a parameter in achieving target
values of similarity or inequality.
In both the IMF and the EU voting games, there is a “natural” justification for assigning weights to
the different players. In the context of IMF, the weights reflect the proportion of financial contribution
made by the different countries while in the case of EU, the weights reflect the population of the different
countries. This is reasonable, since the IMF is a financial organisation while the EU is essentially a
political organisation. In both cases, however, the choice of the winning threshold is not backed by any
quantifiable parameter.
Our work provides methods for choosing a winning threshold which has a quantifiable justification.
There are two options. In the first option, one should choose a value of the winning threshold which
maximises the correlation between the weight vector and an appropriate power profile. In the second
option, one should choose a value of the winning threshold which yields an inequality score for an
appropriate power profile which is closest to the inequality score of the weight vector. In both the cases
of IMF and EU, both the options lead to similar values of the winning threshold. Based on this analysis,
we put forward the suggestion that the voting rule for IMF should be modified to reflect the optimal
value of the winning threshold. In the case of EU, our results provide evidence that the presently used
winning threshold is close to the optimal value.
Previous and Related Works
The Shapley-Shubik power index was introduced in (Shapley, 1953; Shapley and Shubik, 1954), Banzhaf
index was introduced in (Banzhaf, 1965) while Coleman indices were introduced in (Coleman, 1971).
Later work by (Holler, 1982) and (Holler and Packel, 1983) introduced the public good measure/index.
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Deegan and Packel introduced another power measure in (Deegan and Packel, 1978). There are other
known measures/indices and we refer to (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998; Chakravarty et al., 2015) for
further details.
The first work to address the problem of inequality in voting games is (Einy and Peleg, 1991).
They provided an axiomatic deduction of an inequality index for the Shapley-Shubik power measure. A
more general axiomatic treatment of inequality for power measures appears in a paper by (Laruelle and
Valenciano, 2004). This work postulates axioms and deduces an inequality measure for a class of power
indices which includes the Banzhaf index. A more recent work by (Weber, 2016) suggests the use of the
Coefficient of Variation as an inequality index for measuring inequality arising from the Banzhaf index.
Later we provide a more detailed discussion of the relationship of these prior works to our contribution.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Voting Games
We provide some standard definitions arising in the context of voting games. For details the reader may
consult (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998; Chakravarty et al., 2015). In the following, the cardinality of
a finite set S will be denoted by #S and the absolute value of a real number x will be denoted by |x|.
Let N = {A1, A2, . . . , An} be a set of n players. A subset of N is called a voting coalition. The
set of all voting coalitions is denoted by 2N . A voting game G is given by its characteristic function
Ĝ : 2N → {0, 1} where a winning coalition is assigned the value 1 and a losing coalition is assigned the
value 0. Below we recall some basic notions about voting games.
1. For any S ⊆ N and player Ai ∈ N , Ai is said to be a swing in S if Ai ∈ S, Ĝ(S) = 1 but
Ĝ(S \ {Ai}) = 0.
2. For a voting game G, the number of swings for Ai will be denoted by mG(Ai).
3. A player Ai ∈ N is called a dummy player if Ai is not a swing in any coalition, i.e., if mG(Ai) = 0.
4. For a voting game G, the set of all winning coalitions will be denoted by W (G) and the set of all
losing coalitions will be denoted by L(G).
5. A coalition S ⊆ N is called a minimal winning coalition if Ĝ(S) = 1 and there is no T ⊂ S for
which Ĝ(T ) = 1.
6. The set of all minimal winning coalitions in G will be denoted by MW(G) and the set of minimal
winning coalitions containing the player Ai will be denoted as MWG(Ai).
7. A voting gameG is said to be proper if for any coalition S ⊆ N , Ĝ(S) = 1 implies that Ĝ(N\S) = 0.
In other words, in a proper game it is not allowed for both S and its complement to be winning.
Definition 1 Consider a triplet (N,w, q), where N = {A1, . . . , An} is a set of players; w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn)
is a vector of non-negative weights with wi being the weight of Ai; and q is a real number in (0, 1). Let
ω =
∑n
i=1wi. The triplet (N,w, q) defines a weighted majority voting game G given by its characteristic
function Ĝ : 2N → {0, 1} in the following manner. Let wS =
∑
Ai∈S wi denote the sum of the weights
of all the players in the coalition S ⊆ N . Then
Ĝ(S) =
{
1 if wS/ω ≥ q,
0 otherwise.
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We will write G = (N,w, q) to denote the weighted majority voting game arising from the triplet
(N,w, q).
For a weighted majority voting game G = (N,w, q) to be proper, it is necessary that q > 0.5. For
the technical analysis of weighted majority voting games, we do not restrict to proper games. When
considering applications, as is conventional, one should consider only proper games.
2.2 Voting Power
The notion of power is an important concept in a voting system. A power measure captures the
capability of a player to influence the outcome of a vote.
Given a game G on a set of players N and a player Ai in N , a power measure P associates a non-
negative real number vi = PG(Ai) to the player Ai. The number vi captures the power that Ai has in
the game G. If
∑
A∈G PG(A) = 1 for all games G, then P is called a power index. In other words, for a
power index the powers of the individual players sum to 1.
A widely studied index of voting power is the Shapley-Shubik index. This index, however, is defined
for a voting game where the order in which the players cast their votes is important. In our application
of voting power to the voting games arising in the IMF and EU decision making processes, the order of
casting votes is not important. So, we do not consider the Shapley-Shubik index in this work. Below
we provide the definitions of some of the previously proposed power measures. See (Felsenthal and
Machover, 1998; Chakravarty et al., 2015) for further details.
Banzhaf Power Measures. The raw Banzhaf power measure BRG(Ai) for a player Ai in the game
G is defined as the number of distinct coalitions in which Ai is a swing. Hence,
BRG(Ai) = mG(Ai).
The non-normalized Banzhaf power measure BZNG(Ai) is defined as follows.
BZNG(Ai) =
BRG(Ai)
2n−1
=
mG(Ai)
2n−1
.
The Banzhaf normalized power index BZG(Ai) is defined as follows.
BZG(Ai) =
BRG(Ai)∑n
j=1 BRG(Aj)
=
mG(Ai)∑n
j=1mG(Aj)
.
Coleman Power Measures. The Coleman preventive power measure CPG(Ai) for a player Ai in the
game G is a measure of its ability to stop a coalition S from achieving wS ≥ q. It is defined as follows.
CPG(Ai) =
mG(Ai)
#W (G)
.
The Coleman initiative power measure CIG(Ai) for a player Ai in the game G is a measure of its
ability to turn an otherwise losing coalition S with wS < q into a winning coalition with wS∪{Ai} ≥ q.
It is defined as follows.
CIG(Ai) =
mG(Ai)
#L(G)
=
mG(Ai)
2n −#W (G) =
CPG(Ai)
2n
#W (G) − 1
.
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Holler Public Good Index. Holler proposed the public good index PGIAi(G) as follows.
PGIAi(G) =
#MWG(Ai)∑
Aj∈N #MWG(Aj)
.
The non-normalized version of PGIAi(G) is called the absolute public good measure. It is defined as
PGMAi(G) =
#MWG(Ai)
#MW(G)
.
Deegan-Packel Power Measure. The Deegan-Packel power measure DPG(Ai) for a player Ai in
the game G is defined to be
DPG(Ai) =
1
#MW(G)
∑
S∈MWG(Ai)
1
#S
.
Power Profile. Suppose P is a measure of voting power. Then P assigns a non-negative real number
to each of the n players in the game. So, P is given by a vector of non-negative real numbers. This
vector is called the P-power profile of the game.
Computing Voting Powers. A weighted majority voting game G = (N,w, q) is completely specified
by the set of players N , a weight vector w and the threshold q. Given this data, it is of interest to be
able to compute the P-power profile for any power measure P. There are known dynamic programming
based algorithms for computing the values of the different voting power indices. We refer to (Matsui
and Matsui, 2000; Chakravarty et al., 2015) for an introduction to algorithms for computing voting
powers. In our work, we have implemented the algorithms for computing the P-power profiles where P
is any of the power measures defined above.
There is a large literature on voting powers. The various indices mentioned above have been intro-
duced to model certain aspects of voting games which are not adequately covered by the other indices.
There have been axiomatic characterisations of these indices. A detailed discussion of the relevant
literature is not really within the focus of the present work. Instead we refer to the highly respected
monograph (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) and the more recent textbook (Chakravarty et al., 2015)
for such details. Our concern in this work is how to quantify the efficacy of any particular voting power
measure that one may choose for a particular application.
2.3 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient
Given vectors w = (w1, . . . , wn) and v = (v1, . . . , vn), Pearson’s correlation coefficient is the standard
measure of linear correlation between these two vectors. It is defined as follows.
PCC(w,v) =
{
0 if w1 = · · · = wn or v1 = · · · = vn;∑n
i=1(wi−µw)(vi−µv)√∑n
i=1(wi−µw)2
√∑n
i=1(vi−µv)2
otherwise. (1)
Here µw and µv are the means of w and v respectively.
From (1), it follows that for any two non-zero real numbers γ and δ,
PCC(w,v) = PCC(γw, δv). (2)
The relation captured in (2) can be considered to be a scale invariance property of the Pearson’s
Correlation Coefficient.
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2.4 Inequality Indices
The notion of inequality has been considered for social parameters including income, skills, education,
health and wealth (Cowell, 2016). There are several methods for measuring inequality. At a basic
level, the idea of an inequality index I is the following. Given a vector a whose components are real
numbers, I(a) produces a non-negative real number r. In other words, the index I assigns an inequality
score of r to the vector a. There is a large literature on inequality indices including the measurement
of multidimensional inequality (Chakravarty and Lugo, 2016; Chakravarty, 2017). In this work, we
will consider only basic inequality indices. Some of the most commonly used inequality indices are
mentioned below.
Given a vector a of real numbers, let µa and σa denote the mean and standard deviation of a. In
the definition of the inequality indices below, we will assume that the entries of a are non-negative and
µa is positive.
Gini Index. The value of the Gini index of a vector a = (a1, . . . , an) is given by
GI(a) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1|ai − aj |
2n
∑n
i=1 ai
. (3)
Coefficient of Variation. For a vector a = (a1, . . . , an), the Coefficient of Variation is computed as
the ratio of the standard deviation σa to the mean µa of a.
CoV(a) =
σa
µa
=
√
1
n
∑n
i=1 a
2
i −
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 ai
)2
1
n
∑n
i=1 ai
. (4)
Generalised Entropy Index. The generalised entropy index is a measure of inequality based on
information theory. For a real number α, the generalized entropy index GEIα(a) is defined in the
following manner.
GEIα(a) =

1
α(α−1)
(
1
n
∑
Ai∈N
(
ai
µa
)α − 1) if α 6= 0, 1;
1
n
∑
Ai∈N,ai>0
(
ai
µ+a
)
ln
(
ai
µ+a
)
if α = 1;
− 1n
∑
Ai∈N,ai>0 ln
(
ai
µ+a
)
if α = 0.
(5)
Here ln denotes the natural logarithm and µ+a denotes the mean of the positive entries in a. Also, note
that for α = 0, 1 the sum is over positive values of ai as otherwise the ln function gets applied to 0.
In other words, for α = 0 and 1, the computation of inequality considers only the positive entries of a.
GEI1 is called the Theil Index and GEI2 is half the square of CoV.
Remark: For application to the context of voting powers, a power of zero implies that the player is a
dummy. If GEI0 or GEI1 is used to measure inequality, then such dummy players will get ignored. As a
result, the inequality in the power profile will not be adequately captured by these two measures. Due
to this reason, GEI0 and GEI1 are not suitable for measuring inequality in voting powers. GEI2 is half
the square of CoV and will essentially spread out the value of CoV. The relevance of GEIk for k > 2 to
the context of voting power is not clear. So, though we have computed, we do not report the values of
GEI in this work.
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Computing Inequality Indices. It is quite routine to implement an algorithm, which given a vector
of non-negative quantities computes the values of the various inequality indices. In our work, we have
implemented algorithms to compute the Gini Index and the Coefficient of Variation.
Desirable Properties of an Inequality Index. A few basic and natural properties have been
postulated which any reasonable inequality measure should satisfy. Below we mention these properties.
See (Cowell, 2016) for more details. Let I be a postulated inequality index and a = (a1, . . . , an) be a
vector of non-negative real numbers.
Let pi be a bijection from {1, . . . , n} to itself, i.e., pi is a permutation of {1, . . . , n}. Define api to be
the vector (api(1), . . . , api(n)), i.e., api is a reordering of the components of a.
Anonymity (ANON): I is said to satisfy anonymity if I(a) = I(api) for all permutations pi of {1, . . . , n}.
Anonymity captures the property that inequality depends only on the (multi-)set of values {a1, . . . , an}.
Information related to ordering or labelling of these values using names are irrelevant for the measure-
ment of inequality.
Egalitarian Principle (EP): I is said to satisfy the egalitarian principle if I(a) = 0 for all a such
that a1 = · · · = an. EP captures the property that the inequality is the minimum possible when all
components of the vector a have the same value.
Scale Invariance (ScI). I is said to satisfy scale invariance if I(a) = I(γa) for all real γ > 0. The idea
behind scale invariance is that if all the values are scaled by the same factor then the inequality remains
unchanged.
Let a[k] denote the vector a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, a2, . . . , a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
. . . , an, . . . , an︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
 .
Population Principle (PP). I is said to satisfy the population principle if I(a) = I(a[k]) for any integer
k ≥ 1. The vector a[k] contains k copies of each of the values a1, . . . , an. PP says that the inequality in
such a vector remains the same as in the original vector, i.e., by replicating each of the components of
the original vector the same number of times does not change the inequality.
For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, let ai,j,δ be the vector
(a1, . . . , ai−1, ai + δ, . . . , aj − δ, aj+1, . . . , an).
Transfer Principle (TP). I is said to satisfy the transfer principle if I(a) ≥ I(ai,j,δ) for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n
and δ > 0 such that ai < aj and ai+δ ≤ aj−δ. The transfer principle says that if δ units are transferred
from a richer person to a poorer person without changing their relative ordering, then inequality cannot
increase.
Suppose a1, . . . ,ak are vectors of dimensions n1, . . . , nk respectively with non-negative real entries.
Let µi be the mean of ai and define µ = (µ1, . . . , µk). Let a be the vector formed by concatenating the
vectors a1, . . . ,ak.
Decomposability (Decom). I is said to satisfy decomposability if I(a) = ∑ki=1 niI(ai) + I(µ). Decom-
posibility captures the following idea. The vector a is divided into k groups and inequality is measured
for each of the groups. Further, the mean of each group is computed and inequality is computed for
the vector composing of the means. The inequality for each group is ‘within group inequality’ whereas
the inequality in the vector of means is some kind of ‘across group inequality’. The index I satisfies
decomposability if the overall inequality in the vector can be decomposed into a sum of ‘within group
inequality’ and ‘across group inequality’.
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The Gini Index, the Coefficient of Variation and the Generalised Entropy Indices satisfy ANON, EP,
ScI, PP and TP. It has been shown (Shorrocks, 1980) that any index which satisfies ANON, ScI, PP, TP
and Decom must necessarily have the form of a generalised entropy index for some value of α.
ANON, EP, ScI and TP are natural properties that any inequality index should satisfy irrespective of
the domain to which it is applied. PP becomes relevant in the context of variable population size. For
voting games, the players constitute the population which is fixed. So, the application of PP to voting
games is vacuous. On the other hand, it is not clear that Decom is necessarily a desirable property
for all applications of inequality. In particular, it is not clear that Decom is relevant in the context of
voting powers which is the focus of the present work.
3 Weight-Power Similarity
Let P be a measure of voting power. Suppose this is applied to a weighted majority voting game
G = (N,w, q). Let v be the resulting power profile. It is of interest to know how similar the power
profile vector v is to the weight vector w. Note that the power profile vector v depends on the winning
threshold q. Based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, we define the similarity index P-SIw(q) as
follows.
P-SIw(q) = PCC(w,v) (6)
where v is the power profile vector generated by the voting power measure P applied to the weighted
majority voting game G = (N,w, q).
So, for a fixed q, P-SIw(q) measures the similarity of the power profile vector to the weight vector
by the correlation between these two vectors. Note that P-SIw(q) is a function of q. As, q changes, the
power profile vector v will also change, though the weight vector w will not change. So, with change
in q, the correlation between w and v changes. By varying q, it is possible to study the change in the
correlation between w and v.
Theorem 1 Let G = (N,w, q) be a weighted majority voting game such that 0 < #W (G) < 2n. Then
for any q ∈ (0, 1) the following holds.
1. BZN-SIw(q) = BZ-SIw(q) = CP-SIw(q) = CI-SIw(q).
2. PGI-SIw(q) = PGM-SIw(q).
Proof: Let v = (mG(A1), . . . ,mG(An)) be the vector of swings for the players A1, . . . , An in the
game G. Suppose v1,v2,v3 and v4 are the power profiles for G corresponding to BZN, BZ, CP and CI
respectively. Then
v = α1v1 = α2v2 = α3v3 = α4v4
where
α1 = 2
n−1, α2 =
∑
j∈N
mG(Aj), α3 = #W (G) and α4 = #L(G).
In G, the values 2n,
∑
j∈N mG(Aj), #W (G) and #L(G) are fixed. So, α1, α2, α3 and α4 are constants.
Further, since 0 < #W (G) < 2n, it follows that 0 < #L(G) < 2n and so
∑
j∈N mG(Aj) > 0. This in
particular means that α2, α3, α4 > 0 and clearly α1 > 0. So, using (2) we have
BZN-SIw(q) = PCC(w,v1) = PCC(w,v/α1) = PCC(w,v).
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In a similar manner, it follows that BZ-SIw(q)= PCC(w,v), CP-SIw(q)= PCC(w,v) and CI-SIw(q)=
PCC(w,v).
The argument for PGI-SIw(q)= PGM-SIw(q) is similar. 
From the viewpoint of weight-power similarity, Theorem 1 shows that it is sufficient to consider only
BZ-SIw(q), PGI-SIw(q) and DP-SIw(q).
4 Measuring Inequality of Voting Powers
Let G = (N,w, q) be a weighted majority voting game. The weights of all the players are not equal. In
fact, in several important practical situations, the voting game is designed in a manner such that the
weights are indeed unequal. The inequality in the weights can be captured by applying an appropriate
inequality measure. Suppose I is an inequality measure. Then I(w) is the inequality present in the
weights.
Let P be a measure of voting power. Suppose P is applied to G to obtain the power profile vector
v. Then v is a vector consisting of non-negative real numbers. The inequality in the vector v can be
measured by the inequality index I as I(v). The value of I(v) depends on the winning threshold q
whereas the value of I(w) does not depend on q. So, by varying q, it is possible to vary I(v) with
the goal of making it as close to I(w) as possible. Then one can say that the inequality present in the
weights is more or less reflected in the inequality that arises in the voting powers.
Given a weighted majority voting game G = (N,w, q), we define the weight inequality of G with
respect to an inequality measure I as
I-WI(w) = I(w). (7)
We consider two different options for I, namely, GI and CoV. This gives rise to two different measures
of weight inequality, which are GI-WI and CoV-WI.
Given a weighted majority voting game G = (N,w, q), a voting power measure P and an inequality
measure I, the power inequality of P as determined by I is denoted by (P, I)-PIw(q) and is defined in
the following manner.
(P, I)-PIw(q) = I(v) (8)
where v is the power profile vector generated by the power measure P applied to the weighted majority
voting game G = (N,w, q).
We have considered seven options for P, namely, BZN, BZ, CP, CI, PGI, PGM and DP. The following
results shows that under a simple and reasonable condition on an inequality measure I, it is sufficient
to consider only three of these.
Theorem 2 Let I be an inequality index satsifying scale invariance. Let G = (N,w, q) be a weighted
majority voting game such that 0 < #W (G) < 2n. Then for any q ∈ (0, 1) the following holds.
1. (BZ, I)-PIw(q) = (BZ, I)-PIw(q) = (CP, I)-PIw(q) = (CI, I)-PIw(q).
2. (PGI, I)-PIw(q) = (PGM, I)-PIw(q).
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Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 1, let v = (mG(A1), . . . ,mG(An)) be the vector of swings and
v1,v2,v3 and v4 be the power profiles corresponding to BZN, BZ, CP and CI respectively so that
v = α1v1 = α2v2 = α3v3 = α4v4 (9)
where α1, α2, α3 and α4 are the positive constants defined in the proof of Theorem 1.
Using the scale invariance of I we have
(BZN, I)-PIw(q) = I(v1) = I(v/α1) = I(v).
In a similar manner, it follows that (BZ, I)-PIw(q)= I(v) (CP, I)-PIw(q)= I(v) and (CI, I)-PIw(q)=
I(v).
The argument for (PGI, I)-PIw(q)= (PGM, I)-PIw(q) is similar. 
The Gini Index, the Coefficient of Variation and the Generalised Entropy Index satisfy the scale
invariance property. Based on Theorem 2, if I is any of these indices, then from the viewpoint of power
inequality, it is sufficient to consider (BZ, I)-PIw(q), (PGI, I)-PIw(q) and (DP, I)-PIw(q). For I, we
will consider the Gini Index and the Coefficient of Variation. This means that we need to consider 6
possibilities.
Remark: Theorem 2 has been stated for weighted majority voting games. The crux of the argument
is based on (9). This relation does require G to be a weighted majority voting game. So, it is possible
to rewrite the proof to show that for general voting games (which are not necessarily weighted majority
voting games), the inequalities of the different Banzhaf power profiles and the Coleman power profiles
are all equal and also the inequality of the Holler public good index is equal to that of the Holler public
good measure.
Comparison to previous works. The work (Einy and Peleg, 1991) on inequality in voting system
is concerned with measuring inequality arising in the Shapley-Shubik power index. Since we do not
consider this index in our work, we do not comment any further on the work in (Einy and Peleg, 1991).
Instead, we simply remark that our approach can also be applied to the Shapley-Shubik power index.
(Laruelle and Valenciano, 2004) axiomatically derive an inequality index for a class of power indices
which includes the normalised Banzhaf index. We note the following points about the work in (Laruelle
and Valenciano, 2004).
1. The approach works only for an index, i.e., the sum of the powers must sum to one. So, for example
it cannot be applied to measure inequality arising in either of the Coleman power measures.
2. The notion of power considered in the work is based on swings. So, the power measures given by
PGI, PGM and DP are not covered by their work.
3. Among the axioms, ANON and EP are assumed and it is shown that the obtained measure satisfies
ScI. On the other hand, PP and TP are not mentioned in the paper and it is not clear whether
these two properties hold for the obtained measure.
4. Justification for one of the axioms (namely, Constant Sensitivity to Null Players) is not clear. In
the discussion leading up to this axiom, the authors remark: “Thus, at this point any further step
is questionable, though necessary to specify an index.”
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In view of the above, we feel that it might be preferable to study the behaviour of standard inequality
indices on both power measures and power indices rather than relying on an axiomatically derived
inequality index where at least one of the axioms does not necessarily have a natural justification.
(Weber, 2016) considered the application1 of the Coefficient of Variation to the measurement of
inequality for essentially the normalised Banzhaf index. In contrast, we consider all the standard
inequality indices and a much larger class of power measures/indices. Even for the Coefficient of
Variation, the result that the scale invariance property implies that all the swing based measures have
the same inequality is not present in (Weber, 2016).
5 Variation of Similarity and Inequality with Winning Threshold
We have conducted some experiments to understand the dependence of the similarity and inequality
indices of power profiles on the winning threshold.
In the first experiment, N was taken to be {A1, . . . , A30} and one hundred weight vectors were
generated where the individual weights were chosen to be integers independently and uniformly in the
range [1, . . . , 100]. For each of the 100 weight vectors w, the value of the winning threshold q was varied
from 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01. For the game defined by the triplet (N,w, q), the power profiles for
the different power measures were computed. From this, the similarity indices BZ-SIw(q), PGI-SIw(q)
and DP-SIw(q) were computed and the inequality indices I-WI(w), (BZN, I)-PIw(q), (PGI, I)-PIw(q)
and (DP, I)-PIw(q) were computed where I was taken to be GI and CoV. All the obtained results show
a definite pattern.
A second experiment was conducted with n = 30 and non-random weights. In particular, two
distinct values of weights were used, namely, n1 of the weights were taken to be 100 and n2 of the
weights were taken to be 1 with n1 + n2 = 30. The value of q was varied as mentioned above and the
corresponding similarity and inequality indices were computed. In this case, no definite pattern was
observed and there was a rich variation in the behaviour.
To further explain the above experiments, we report three particular cases with n = 30.
Case-I: A random weight vector. The actual value of w (after sorting into descending order) came
out to be
{93, 92, 90, 86, 86, 83, 82, 77, 72, 68, 67, 67, 63, 62, 62, 59, 49, 40, 36, 35, 35, 30, 29, 27, 26, 26, 23, 21, 15, 11}.
The plots of similarity, Gini Index and the Coefficient of Variation are shown in Figures 1, 2
and 3 respectively.
Case-II: 15 of the weights were taken to be 100 and the other 15 of the weights were taken to be 1.
The plots of similarity, Gini Index and the Coefficient of Variation are shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6
respectively.
Case-III: 29 of the weights were taken to be 100 and the other weight was taken to be 1. The plots of
similarity, Gini Index and the Coefficient of Variation are shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9 respectively.
Based on the plots, we make the following observations.
1. For the random case, compared to the Holler index and the Deegan-Packel measure, the Banzhaf
index is a much better marker of similarity to the weight vector and it also much better at
1The author mistakenly remarks: “To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to propose a measure of inequality
of voting systems that can be used across different constituencies.” The work by Laruelle and Valenciano (Laruelle and
Valenciano, 2004) is much earlier.
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capturing the inequality present in the weights. For the two non-random cases, there is not much
difference between the three power measures.
2. For Case-II, there are sharp spikes in the similarity and inequality plots. These correspond to
choices of q for which the low weight players achieve power similar to the high weight players.
3. For Case-III, there is one player with low weight. Apart from a small range of q where this player
gains significant power, for other values of q this player becomes a dummy. The inequality indices,
however, do not reflect this. The inequality scores are generally quite low indicating that there is
small inequality in the system. This is a feature of the inequality indices which are not sensitive
to low scores of a small number of players.
6 Applications
6.1 IMF Voting Games
The IMF has two decision making bodies, namely, the Board of Governors (BoG) and the Executive
Board (EB).
A total of 189 member countries make up the BoG. Each country has a specified voting share.
The voting share or weight of a country is calculated as the sum of a basic weight plus an amount
which is proportional to the special drawing rights of the country. The EB consists of 24 Executive
Directors (EDs) representing all the 189 member countries. Eight of these directors are nominated by
eight member countries while each of the other directors are elected by a group of countries. Each ED
has a voting weight which is the sum of the voting weights of the countries that he or she represents.
The BoG is the highest decision making body of the IMF and is officially responsible for all major
decisions. In practice, however, the BoG has delegated most of its powers to the EB2. Accordingly, in
this work, we will consider only the voting game arising from the EB weights.
Actual weights of the members of the EB are available from the IMF website3. These weights
range from the minimum of 80157 to the maximum of 831407. Since these values are rather large, for
the purposes of computation of voting powers, we have divided these voting weights by 1000 and then
rounded to the nearest integer. While this is an approximation, it does not significantly affect the voting
powers. In particular, we have checked that no two members with originally unequal weights get the
same weight after this rounding off process. The acutal weight vector that has been used to compute
the voting powers is the following.
wimf = {831, 310, 306, 273, 268, 267, 219, 208, 203, 203, 196, 170, 165, 162, 155, 154, 150, 149, 138, 131, 111, 101, 82, 80}. (10)
The rules specify several winning thresholds4. We mention these below.
“Except as otherwise specifically provided, all decisions of the Fund shall be made by a
majority of the votes cast.”
“The Fund, by a seventy percent majority of the total voting power, may decide at any
time to distribute any part of the general reserve.”
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund
3https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx
4https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm
14
“The Fund may use a member’s currency held in the Investment Account for investment
as it may determine, in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Fund by a
seventy percent majority of the total voting power.”
“An eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power shall be required for any
change in quotas.”
So, three possible values of q are used: q = 0.5, q = 0.7 and q = 0.85.
We have computed the similarity and inequality indices for the IMF EB voting game with q varying
from 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01. The plots of BZ-SIwimf (q), PGI-SIwimf (q) and DP-SIwimf (q) are shown
in Figure 10; the plots of (BZ,GI)-PIwimf (q), (PGI,GI)-PIwimf (q) and (DP,GI)-PIwimf (q) are shown in
Figure 11; and the plots of (BZ,CoV)-PIwimf (q), (PGI,CoV)-PIwimf (q) and (DP,CoV)-PIwimf (q) are shown
in Figure 12. The actual values of these indices for the range [0.5, 0.65] along with the values for q = 0.70
and q = 0.85 are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Based on these data, we have the following observations.
1. The Holler and the Deegan-Packel indices are not good indicators of either the similarity to or
the inequality present in the weights. So, we focus only on the Banzhaf index.
2. The following holds for the Banzhaf index:
• The plots of the two inequality indices have bell curve shapes. To a lesser extent, the same
is also true of the similarity index.
• The maximum similarity is achieved for q = 0.60.
• For the Gini Index, the inequality in the power profile is closest to the inequality in the
weights for q = 0.61.
• For the Coefficient of Variation, the inequality in the power profile is closest to the inequality
in the weights for q = 0.60.
From Tables 1 and 2 we note that in comparison to q = 0.60, the choices q = 0.50, q = 0.70 and q = 0.85
are sub-optimal.
Based on the above analysis, we put forward the suggestion that the winning threshold of q = 0.60
be seriously considered for any future possible change in voting rule. For q = 0.60, the actual values of
the different power measures are shown in Table 3.
6.2 EU Voting Games
Until Brexit is effective, the European Union Council has 28 members. It votes on different types of
matters in three different ways5. The first is the unanimity voting where all members have to vote in
favour or against for the motion to be passed or dismissed. In non-legislative issues, a simple majority
voting is done where at least 15 out of the 28 members have to vote in favour. For most (80%) of the
issues that are voted upon in the EU Council, the “qualified majority” method is used. This is stated
as follows6.
“A qualified majority needs 55% of member states, representing at least 65% of the EU
population.”
It is the qualified majority voting rule that we consider in the context of weighted majority voting
games. The population percentages of the individual countries are available7 and are reproduced in
5http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/
6http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/
7http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/voting-calculator/
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Table 1: IMF EB similarity indices.
q BZ-SIwimf (q) PGI-SIwimf (q) DP-SIwimf (q)
0.50 0.9938690 0.7743330 0.9330398
0.51 0.9939952 0.8965981 0.9531445
0.52 0.9943706 0.9363455 0.9618091
0.53 0.9949599 0.9522328 0.9669979
0.54 0.9957522 0.9600696 0.9708993
0.55 0.9966513 0.9649342 0.9740920
0.56 0.9975953 0.9688469 0.9771681
0.57 0.9985210 0.9730949 0.9806975
0.58 0.9992881 0.9769905 0.9839294
0.59 0.9998168 0.9806887 0.9869004
0.60 0.9999911 0.9846956 0.9899614
0.61 0.9996918 0.9882609 0.9924378
0.62 0.9988216 0.9912144 0.9942195
0.63 0.9972257 0.9936152 0.9953372
0.64 0.9948817 0.9951439 0.9954396
0.65 0.9916875 0.9956169 0.9945365
0.70 0.9609858 0.9788570 0.9715726
0.85 0.7634234 0.7787653 0.7721551
Table 4. These percentages are the weights of the individual countries. For computation of the voting
powers, the percentage values are multiplied by 100 to convert these into integers which are then used
as the weights. This scaling does not affect the decision making process.
In the qualified majority voting, the passing rule is a joint condition, one on the number of member
states which are involved and the other on the population percentage. While analysing the joint con-
dition would be more accurate, for the purpose of this work, we have worked with the simpler setting
where only the winning condition on the population percentage is considered. This leads to a weighted
majority voting game where the weight vector weu is specified in Table 4 and the winning threshold is
q = 0.65.
For the weight vector weu given in Table 4, we have computed the similarity and inequality indices
with q varying from 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01. The plots of BZ-SIweu(q), PGI-SIweu(q) and DP-SIweu(q)
are shown in Figure 13; the plots of (BZ,GI)-PIweu(q), (PGI,GI)-PIweu(q) and (DP,GI)-PIweu(q) are shown
in Figure 14; and the plots of (BZ,CoV)-PIweu(q), (PGI,CoV)-PIweu(q) and (DP,CoV)-PIweu(q) are shown
in Figure 15. The actual values of these indices for the range [0.5, 0.7] are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Based on these data, we have the following observations.
1. As in the case of the IMF-EB voting game, the Holler and the Deegan-Packel indices are not good
indicators of either the similarity to or the inequality present in the weights. So, again we focus
only on the Banzhaf index.
2. The following holds for the Banzhaf index:
• The plots of the two inequality indices as well as the similarity index have a somewhat bell
shape nature.
• The maximum similarity is achieved for q = 0.66.
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Table 2: Inequality as measured by GI and CoV in the IMF Game. In the table, f1(q) = (BZ,GI)-
PIwimf (q), f2(q) = (PGI,GI)-PIwimf (q), f3(q) = (DP,GI)-PIwimf (q), g1(q) = (BZ,CoV)-PIwimf (q), g2(q) =
(PGI,CoV)-PIwimf (q), g3(q) = (DP,CoV)-PIwimf (q). Note GI-WI(wimf) = 0.285042 and CoV-WI(wimf) =
0.689527.
q f1(q) f2(q) f3(q) g1(q) g2(q) g3(q)
0.50 0.316535 0.013684 0.023564 0.859515 0.033982 0.061049
0.51 0.316212 0.017718 0.027366 0.857502 0.046205 0.074206
0.52 0.315214 0.021654 0.031084 0.851387 0.059712 0.086957
0.53 0.313531 0.025291 0.034457 0.841354 0.072727 0.098447
0.54 0.311215 0.028989 0.037852 0.827460 0.085147 0.108920
0.55 0.308401 0.032545 0.041122 0.810689 0.096331 0.118073
0.56 0.305067 0.035747 0.044020 0.791192 0.105924 0.125614
0.57 0.301236 0.038982 0.046930 0.769085 0.114385 0.132059
0.58 0.297133 0.042029 0.049670 0.745825 0.121321 0.137161
0.59 0.292743 0.044794 0.052123 0.721395 0.126885 0.141047
0.60 0.288019 0.047504 0.054517 0.695812 0.131366 0.144021
0.61 0.283235 0.050075 0.056795 0.670527 0.134712 0.131366
0.62 0.278285 0.052419 0.058857 0.645342 0.137090 0.147386
0.63 0.273201 0.054555 0.060691 0.620092 0.138635 0.147978
0.64 0.268155 0.056714 0.062592 0.596040 0.139694 0.148302
0.65 0.263088 0.058572 0.064200 0.572826 0.140068 0.148049
0.66 0.257927 0.060254 0.065613 0.550134 0.139974 0.147422
0.67 0.252875 0.061895 0.067025 0.528952 0.139751 0.146796
0.68 0.247854 0.063419 0.068331 0.508843 0.139248 0.145961
0.69 0.242726 0.064596 0.069269 0.489429 0.138348 0.144745
0.70 0.237753 0.065816 0.070276 0.471442 0.137616 0.143776
0.85 0.158497 0.066284 0.068153 0.278829 0.116985 0.120198
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Table 3: Voting powers of the players under various power measures for the IMF-EB game with q = 0.60.
Instead of the players, the voting powers are shown against the weights of the players.
Wts BZN BZ CP CI PGI PGM DP
831 0.4033509 0.1661335 0.8949349 0.2603447 0.0662802 0.8888586 0.0682873
310 0.1508728 0.0621420 0.3347491 0.0973816 0.0435712 0.5843174 0.0442821
306 0.1488262 0.0612990 0.3302082 0.0960606 0.0434846 0.5831563 0.0441693
273 0.1322311 0.0544638 0.2933878 0.0853492 0.0427837 0.5737562 0.0432420
268 0.1297327 0.0534347 0.2878445 0.0837366 0.0426849 0.5724312 0.0431133
267 0.1292485 0.0532353 0.2867701 0.0834240 0.0426597 0.5720929 0.0430820
219 0.1055294 0.0434658 0.2341434 0.0681144 0.0416246 0.5582125 0.0417465
208 0.1001409 0.0412464 0.2221877 0.0646364 0.0414027 0.5552361 0.0414634
203 0.0976979 0.0402401 0.2167671 0.0630595 0.0413069 0.5539514 0.0413394
203 0.0976979 0.0402401 0.2167671 0.0630595 0.0413069 0.5539514 0.0413394
196 0.0942787 0.0388318 0.2091809 0.0608526 0.0411606 0.5519899 0.0411522
170 0.0816418 0.0336269 0.1811427 0.0526961 0.0406361 0.5449551 0.0404690
165 0.0792183 0.0326287 0.1757655 0.0511318 0.0405488 0.5437851 0.0403568
162 0.0777606 0.0320283 0.1725313 0.0501909 0.0404977 0.5430995 0.0402881
155 0.0743695 0.0306316 0.1650074 0.0480022 0.0403450 0.5410517 0.0400980
154 0.0738934 0.0304355 0.1639510 0.0476948 0.0403227 0.5407521 0.0400702
150 0.0719494 0.0296347 0.1596377 0.0464400 0.0402490 0.5397639 0.0399749
149 0.0714759 0.0294397 0.1585871 0.0461344 0.0402247 0.5394390 0.0399449
138 0.0661672 0.0272532 0.1468086 0.0427079 0.0399681 0.5359976 0.0396272
131 0.0627846 0.0258599 0.1393032 0.0405246 0.0397938 0.5336591 0.0394117
111 0.0531555 0.0218939 0.1179389 0.0343095 0.0389966 0.5229683 0.0384651
101 0.0483502 0.0199146 0.1072770 0.0312079 0.0383484 0.5142761 0.0377462
82 0.0392314 0.0161588 0.0870447 0.0253221 0.0361261 0.4844734 0.0353936
80 0.0382680 0.0157619 0.0849071 0.0247002 0.0356770 0.4784506 0.0349375
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Table 4: Population percentages of the countries in the European Union.
Country Pop % weu
Germany 16.06 % 1606
France 13.05 % 1305
United Kingdom 12.79 % 1279
Italy 12.00 % 1200
Spain 9.09 % 909
Poland 7.43 % 743
Romania 3.87 % 387
Netherlands 3.37 % 337
Belgium 2.21 % 221
Greece 2.11 % 211
Czech Republic 2.04 % 204
Portugal 2.02 % 202
Sweden 1.96 % 196
Hungary 1.92 % 192
Austria 1.71 % 172
Bulgaria 1.40 % 140
Denmark 1.12 % 112
Finland 1.07 % 107
Slovakia 1.06 % 106
Ireland 0.91 % 91
Croatia 0.82 % 82
Lithuania 0.57 % 57
Slovenia 0.40 % 40
Latvia 0.39 % 39
Estonia 0.26 % 26
Cyprus 0.17 % 17
Luxembourg 0.11 % 11
Malta 0.09 % 9
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Table 5: EU game similarity indices.
q BZ-SIweu(q) PGI-SIweu(q) DP-SIweu(q)
0.50 0.9988826 0.3320853 0.5051382
0.51 0.9989581 0.4181647 0.5640333
0.52 0.9991501 0.4929785 0.6151950
0.53 0.9993725 0.5596608 0.6631804
0.54 0.9995411 0.6230357 0.7099130
0.55 0.9996231 0.6830571 0.7540455
0.56 0.9996430 0.7350513 0.7910700
0.57 0.9996501 0.7765455 0.8199512
0.58 0.9996763 0.8063575 0.8409968
0.59 0.9997123 0.8289370 0.8576475
0.60 0.9997249 0.8477416 0.8722319
0.61 0.9996959 0.8642583 0.8846472
0.62 0.9996486 0.8777664 0.8944232
0.63 0.9996354 0.8870017 0.9006101
0.64 0.9996914 0.8932824 0.9048869
0.65 0.9997886 0.8976327 0.9086210
0.66 0.9998332 0.9039397 0.9150038
0.67 0.9997214 0.9135211 0.9242301
0.68 0.9994175 0.9258465 0.9351369
0.69 0.9989968 0.9381400 0.9448867
0.70 0.9986065 0.9465521 0.9507084
• For the Gini Index, the inequality in the power profile is closest to the inequality in the
weights for q = 0.66.
• For the Coefficient of Variation, the inequality in the power profile is closest to the inequality
in the weights for q = 0.66.
So, the value of q = 0.66 is the best in terms of similarity and also for inequality measured by
either the Gini Index or the Coefficient of Variation.
The value of q actually used in the EU voting games is q = 0.65. The corresponding similarity value
and the values for Gini Index and Coefficient of Variation are shown in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
These values show that in comparison to q = 0.66, the choice q = 0.65 is sub-optimal but, very close.
For q = 0.66, the actual values of the different power measures are shown in Table 7.
Unlike the case of the IMF voting game, our analysis shows that for the weighted majority game
arising in the context of EU, the winning threshold is very close to the optimal value. So, our analysis
provides some quantitative backing to the actual winning threshold used in the EU game.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of quantifying whether a power profile adequately captures
the natural variation in the weights of a weighted majority voting game. Ideas based on Pearson’s
Correlation Coefficient and standard inequality measures such as the Gini Index and the Coefficient
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Table 6: Inequality as measured by GI and CoV in the EU Game. In the table h1(q) = (BZ,GI)-PIweu(q),
h2(q) = (PGI,GI)-PIweu(q), h3(q) = (DP,GI)-PIweu(q), k1(q) = (BZ,CoV)-PIweu(q), k2(q) = (PGI,CoV)-
PIweu(q), k3(q) = (DP,CoV)-PIweu(q). Note GI-WI(weu) = 0.605671 and CoV-WI(weu) = 1.272825.
q h1(q) h2(q) h3(q) k1(q) k2(q) k3(q)
0.50 0.614849 0.033960 0.046614 1.309745 0.091907 0.107286
0.51 0.614993 0.039425 0.051749 1.309901 0.095374 0.112346
0.52 0.615391 0.044681 0.056573 1.310338 0.100199 0.118139
0.53 0.615945 0.049083 0.060556 1.310962 0.105176 0.123691
0.54 0.616483 0.052608 0.063782 1.311545 0.109910 0.128951
0.55 0.616834 0.055576 0.067481 1.311731 0.114808 0.134668
0.56 0.616822 0.059365 0.071789 1.311070 0.120243 0.140936
0.57 0.616302 0.063896 0.076268 1.309147 0.126922 0.148409
0.58 0.615243 0.068081 0.080370 1.305796 0.134171 0.156036
0.59 0.613694 0.072437 0.084545 1.301119 0.142004 0.163861
0.60 0.611813 0.076339 0.088256 1.295536 0.149118 0.170797
0.61 0.609851 0.079853 0.091521 1.289678 0.155445 0.176837
0.62 0.608078 0.083431 0.094969 1.284198 0.161705 0.183060
0.63 0.606708 0.086467 0.097851 1.279626 0.167582 0.188834
0.64 0.605893 0.089760 0.101116 1.276296 0.174214 0.195451
0.65 0.605616 0.093045 0.104334 1.274202 0.181046 0.202085
0.66 0.605689 0.096528 0.107787 1.272960 0.188107 0.209023
0.67 0.605797 0.100171 0.111427 1.271778 0.195381 0.216243
0.68 0.605497 0.103949 0.115322 1.269457 0.202594 0.223577
0.69 0.604333 0.107898 0.119249 1.264638 0.210268 0.231500
0.70 0.601994 0.111935 0.123198 1.256239 0.218490 0.239777
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Table 7: Voting powers of the players under various power measures for the EU game with q = 0.66.
Instead of the players, the voting powers are shown against the weights of the players.
Wts BZN BZ CP CI PGI PGM DP
1606 0.2459032 0.1582166 0.7950917 0.1454426 0.0537148 0.8173260 0.0554496
1305 0.2044021 0.1315144 0.6609039 0.1208962 0.0479912 0.7302363 0.0496147
1279 0.2003657 0.1289173 0.6478528 0.1185089 0.0475521 0.7235548 0.0491300
1200 0.1881286 0.1210439 0.6082861 0.1112711 0.0463214 0.7048273 0.0477734
909 0.1444251 0.0929245 0.4669771 0.0854221 0.0410962 0.6253212 0.0423199
743 0.1115583 0.0717777 0.3607073 0.0659826 0.0368236 0.5603092 0.0372597
387 0.0600651 0.0386465 0.1942116 0.0355263 0.0379704 0.5777581 0.0380942
337 0.0523199 0.0336631 0.1691686 0.0309453 0.0371804 0.5657380 0.0372361
221 0.0343284 0.0220872 0.1109957 0.0203039 0.0355657 0.5411688 0.0354550
211 0.0327751 0.0210878 0.1059733 0.0193852 0.0354097 0.5387953 0.0352811
204 0.0316896 0.0203894 0.1024638 0.0187432 0.0353493 0.5378758 0.0352135
202 0.0313774 0.0201886 0.1014543 0.0185586 0.0353118 0.5373050 0.0351703
196 0.0304473 0.0195901 0.0984469 0.0180085 0.0352300 0.5360610 0.0350762
192 0.0298266 0.0191907 0.0964398 0.0176413 0.0352006 0.5356133 0.0350399
171 0.0265634 0.0170911 0.0858887 0.0157112 0.0349022 0.5310729 0.0347002
140 0.0217525 0.0139958 0.0703336 0.0128658 0.0345472 0.5256718 0.0343204
112 0.0173997 0.0111951 0.0562592 0.0102913 0.0341762 0.5200262 0.0338917
107 0.0166246 0.0106964 0.0537533 0.0098328 0.0341039 0.5189262 0.0338115
106 0.0164687 0.0105961 0.0532489 0.0097406 0.0341017 0.5188932 0.0338069
91 0.0141386 0.0090969 0.0457151 0.0083625 0.0338729 0.5154111 0.0335409
82 0.0127383 0.0081959 0.0411873 0.0075342 0.0336632 0.5122204 0.0332955
57 0.0088505 0.0056945 0.0286168 0.0052347 0.0329459 0.5013056 0.0324475
40 0.0062171 0.0040002 0.0201021 0.0036772 0.0321913 0.4898234 0.0315918
39 0.0060615 0.0039000 0.0195989 0.0035851 0.0321094 0.4885777 0.0314986
26 0.0040399 0.0025993 0.0130624 0.0023894 0.0300802 0.4577017 0.0292896
17 0.0026410 0.0016992 0.0085393 0.0015621 0.0273734 0.4165147 0.0264409
11 0.0017116 0.0011013 0.0055342 0.0010123 0.0238031 0.3621886 0.0228048
9 0.0013991 0.0009002 0.0045238 0.0008275 0.0214120 0.3258058 0.0204462
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of Variation have been used in the formalisation. These ideas have been applied to the voting games
arising in the context of the IMF and the EU. We provide concrete quantitative evidence that the
actual winning threshold used in the IMF games is sub-optimal and instead propose a new value of the
winning threshold which has firm theoretical justification. In the case of the EU game, the actual value
of the winning threshold used is close to the optimal value. So, in this case, our analysis provides some
quantitative backing to the value of the winning threshold that is actually used.
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Figure 1: Similarity indices for Case-I.
Figure 2: Gini index for Case-I.
Figure 3: Coefficient of Variation for Case-I.
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Figure 4: Similarity indices for Case-II.
Figure 5: Gini index for Case-II.
Figure 6: Coefficient of Variation for Case-II.
26
Figure 7: Similarity indices for Case-III.
Figure 8: Gini index for Case-III.
Figure 9: Coefficient of Variation for Case-III.
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Figure 10: Similarity indices for IMF EB weights.
Figure 11: Gini index for IMF EB weights.
Figure 12: Coefficient of Variation for IMF EB weights.
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Figure 13: Similarity indices for EU weights.
Figure 14: Gini index for EU weights.
Figure 15: Coefficient of Variation for EU weights.
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